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DOING GOOD AND GETTING WORSE:·THE 
DILEMMA OF SOCIAL POLICY 
Gerald N. Grob*t 
DOING Goon: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE. By Willard Gay-
lin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus, and David J. Rothman. New 
York: Pantheon Books. 1978. Pp. xv, 170. Paper, .$2.95. 
I 
Since the Second World War historians and social scientists 
have become increasingly interested in the concept of "social pol-
icy.~' A vague term, social policy generally refers to actions taken 
by governments to deal with social and economic distress and 
other problems of modern society. More specifically; social policy 
has a variety of different but related goals: (1) to mitigate or 
abolish poverty; (2) to provide for groups unable to survive with-
out some form of economic assistance; (3) to improve and human-
ize conditions of work; ( 4) to grapple with the sanitary and hy-
gienic problems resulting from modern technology and urbaniza-
tion; (5) to deal with the problem of crime; (6) to establish surro-
gate structures for functions once performed by the family, 
church, or local community. 
The reasons for the contemporary fascination with social pol-
icy are not difficult to understand. Intrinsic issues aside, many 
human beings hold values that imply the possibility of a better 
or more ideal society, as contrasted with the imperfect conditions 
in which they live. It is not surprising, therefore, that interest in 
social policy issues should be on the rise; scholarly detachment 
and moral commitment have rarely been viewed as inherently 
antagonistic. Long-standing reformist and melioristic traditions 
within history and other social science disciplines have merely 
stimulated a kind of scholarship that aims as much to change the 
world as to understand its ways. 
The publication of Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence 
illustrates in a remarkably accurate manner many of the issues 
that are at the center of the debat~ over social policy. 1 The book 
• Professor of History, Rutgers University. B.S.S. 1951, City College of the City 
University of New York; A.M. 1952, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1958, Northwestern 
. University.-Ed. 
t Some of the material used in this paper is drawn from research supported by a grant 
from the Public Health Service (HEW), National Library of Medicine, No. 2306. 
1. The individual authors and chapters in Doing Good are as follows: Gaylin, In The 
Beginning: Helpless and Dependent; Marcus, Their Brothers' Keepers: An Episode from 
761 
762 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:761 
originated when the New York Council for the Humanities 
brought together a group of humanists with a group of practition-
ers involved directly with social policy issues. Out of these sympo-
sia came this volume, which includes essays by four individuals 
who are from different backgrounds and disciplines, but who are 
all concerned with the problems of dependency and their allevia-
tion-past, present, and future. 
II 
At the center of the debate over social policy lies a series of 
basic and sometimes conflicting concerns. What is the obligation 
of the state toward various distressed groups, including (but not 
limited to) the aged, the infirm, the unemployed, the mentally 
ill, and the orphaned? Perhaps even more important, if the state 
has an obligation, what constitutes appropriate means? Are for-
mal institutions that provide total care most desirable? Would a 
policy based upon the goal of integrating dependent persons into 
the community better meet existing needs? Or should the state 
merely provide dependent persons with a minimum cash stipend, 
thus permitting them to decide all issues affecting their personal 
well-being? Beneath such questions lies an equally pressing di-
lemma, namely, how to reconcile the power and authority of the 
state with the rights of dependent populations. That no consensus 
to such questions has emerged is evidenced by the animated and 
sometimes acrimonious debate both in the public arena and the 
courts over public power and public responsibility versus private 
and individual rights. 
It is precisely to these issues that Doing Good addresses it-
self. The first essay by Willard Gaylin (a practicing psychoana-
lyst and psychiatrist, author of some eight books, and co-founder 
and president of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life 
Sciences) deals with the very concept of dependency. Unlike 
many contemporary critics who see the roots of dependency in a 
cruel and unjust social system, Gaylin employs a biological model 
of the caring parent and helpless infant to illuminate this term. 
Many animals are capable of participating in the struggle for 
survival either at birth or shortly thereafter. Newborn infants, on 
the other hand, require an extraordinary amount of care if they 
are to survive. Indeed, infants need not only food but "the give 
English History; Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era; and 
Glasser, Prisoners of Benevolence: Power versus Liberty in the Welfare State. 
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and take of talk and touch, of feeding and fondling, of loving and 
caring" if they are to develop into mature adults capable of as-
suming a comparable role with their own offspring. To be helpless 
is a natural phenomenon that is rooted in the biological experi-
ence of the human race and only becomes a liability when unac-
companied by love. Parentalism and caring, then, are vital for the 
survival of the human species. 
Gaylin, however, is too sophisticated and sensitive a thinker 
to extend a biological paradigm without introducing fine distinc-
tions. Conceding that dependency is intended to be outgrown, he 
also observes that there are various stages in the life cycle when 
individuals will be reduced to states of dependency in that they 
require the aid and assistance of others. Moreover, there are those 
who, for one reason or another, will never reach independence. In 
his eyes, therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the intrin-
sically dependent and the extrinsically dependent. The first 
group includes physically, mentally, or emotionally handicapped 
persons unable to care for themselves, while the second is com-
posed of persons who are made dependent by the culture in which 
they live. The latter have the capacity to be independent, but 
because of social or economic disabilities remain in a dependent 
position. This group is made up of the poor, part of the aged, and 
women constricted by cultural barriers, to mention only a few. 
At this point Gaylin insists that the concept of dependency 
should not be applied to the extrinsically dependent. The solution 
to the problems of the extrinsically dependent is to change the 
category, and then find an appropriate means to create an adult 
role. A change in the condition of this group, in other words, 
depends upon economic and political solutions. The intrinsically 
dependent, by way of contrast, require parental compassion, 
partly because of a moral obligation that we owe to such persons 
and partly because we ourselves might one day join a dependent 
constituency (e.g., the senile). His concluding remarks echo his 
basic theme: "If we are not cared for by others, we cannot care 
for ourselves. . . . When we neglect the weak and helpless, the 
disenfranchised and disadvantaged, we betray our loving nature 
and endanger the social future that depends on our caring." 
The remaining three essays in Doing Good represent the 
views of three individuals who are sharply critical of the results 
of benevolence. Indeed, each shares a belief that institutions for 
dependents and social policy generally have done greater harm 
than good, and that good intentions and parental concern in the 
aggregate can have disastrous c9nsequences. In this respect all 
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three authors mirror the mood of disillusionment that appeared 
in the latter part of the 1960s and became pervasive in the 1970s. 
Institutions, once regarded as the fruits of liberal and progressive 
reform, are in their view instruments of coercion and repression, 
depriving individuals of their rights and making them conform to 
the behavioral standards of dominant elites. 
Two of these essays seek to legitimate their criticisms of the 
existing order by studying the past. The first is by Steven Mar-
cus, a specialist in nineteenth-century English literature, author 
of four books, and currently director of planning for the National 
Humanities Center. At the very outset Marcus rejects Gaylin's 
biological model of the loving parent, pointing out that a dra-
matic epistemological rupture takes place when we move from 
individual to group or class behavior. Somehow, the latter leads 
to certain kinds of acts that would be unthinkable to persons 
acting in an individual capacity toward another. "How is it," asks 
Marcus, " . . . that good people-decent, upright, and well-
meaning citizens-can contrive, when they act on behalf of others 
and in the name of some higher principle or of some benign inter-
est, to behave so harshly, coercively, and callously, so at odds 
with what they understand to be their good intentions." 
To illustrate in a concrete manner the thrust of his argument, 
Marcus examines in detail the evolution of the English Poor Law 
system in the four decades following 1795. After a brief descrip-
tion of the Elizabethan Poor Law Act of 1601, he describes the 
social changes that followed the enclosure movement. By the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century the typical English agricultural 
worker had become a rootless individual whose condition was 
determined not by the reciprocal rights and duties of medieval 
society, but rather by an impersonal wage system. The destruc-
tion of the social fabric of the English countryside was completed 
in 1795 with the annulment of the Act of Settlement of 1662, 
which had restricted mobility and bound a laborer to his parish. 
At the same time, local officials, concerned with rising unemploy-
ment, greater relief expenditures, and a widespread degradation 
of the poor, began_ to experiment with administrative solutions. 
In so doing they introduced a momentous reform, namely, the 
subsidization of wages along a scale dependent upon the price of 
bread. Intended to protect workers against the vagaries of a free 
and impersonal market, the new system ultimately universalized 
pauperism. Given a guaranteed minimum subsistence, workers 
lacked any incentive to increase productivity and farmers had 
little incentive to pay them higher wages. Degradation, dehu-
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manization, and a fall in productivity went hand in hand. 
Between 1795 and 1834, according to Marcus, Englishmen 
engaged in the first detailed and extended debate on poverty in 
Western society. Figures such as Thomas Malthus and Jeremy 
Bentham focussed their attention on the alleviation of poverty. 
Out of their efforts (and others') came the passage of the Poor 
Law Act of 1834, which attempted to make relief so odious and 
humiliating that people would do everything within their power 
to avoid having to apply for it. Moreover, the Act created a new 
kind of administrative machinery that involved centralized 
decision-making by a professional bureaucracy. The poor in Eng-
land were thus forced into an impersonal and competitive labor 
market, the results of which were described in vivid terms by 
Charles Dickens, who was acutely aware that a free labor market 
could easily become synonymous with isolation and abandon-
ment. The lesson that can be learned from these events, con-
cludes Marcus, "is that we can degrade people by caring for 
them; and we can degrade them by not caring for them." All 
interventions have consequences. "Dependents, precisely because 
.they are dependent and often unable to help themselves, deserve 
more than others to be protected from the unintended conse-
quences of our benevolence and the incalculable consequences of 
our social good will." 
In the next essay David J. Rothman, a Columbia University 
historian and author of several books (including the well-known, 
influential, and controversial The Discovery of the Asylum), ex-
amines social policy in the Progressive era (1900-1920) from the 
perspective of the 1960s and 1970s. During the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, a group of "reformers" helped to shape 
a concept of the state as parent. Concerned only with the "needs" 
of disadvantaged groups and oblivious of the "rights" of client 
populations, these reformers expanded the boundaries of political 
intervention and created new forms of social amelioration. This 
Progressive tradition, according to Rothman, was so attached to 
a paternalistic model that its proponents never recognized that 
moral coercion could as easily injure people as it could aid them. 
Indeed, many Progressive innovations-including what is today 
the Aid to Dependent Children program, juvenile courts, and 
programs to deal with recidivists, defectives, mentally retarded, 
and the unworthy poor-adversely affected the recipients of gov-
ernment welfare programs. 
At the heart of Progressive ideology, moreover, lay a series 
of unquestioned assumptions. First, Progressives rejected the 
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nineteenth-century liberal idea that the sum of individual self-
interest maximized the common welfare. Second, they had cu-
rious faith in the ability of the state to accomplish desirable social 
ends: Finally, they assumed that the goal of social policy was the 
transformation of a heterogeneous social mass into a single mid-
dle class in which diverse cultural and ethnic traditions would 
conform to a unitary moral code. Within the framework of these 
assumptions, there could be no adversarial relationship between 
the state and the client. Slowly but surely, argues Rothman, the 
prerogatives of public officials were correspondingly increased as 
the legal protections and rights of their clients were diminished. 
Paradoxically, by the 1960s virtually every Progressive inno-
vation and institution was regarded as a failure. Why did such a 
radical transformation in attitudes and perceptions occur? In re-
cent decades, writes Rothman by way of explanation, there has 
been a general decline in the legitimacy-of institutions and indi-
viduals, and a pervasive mistrust of all constituted authority. 
Significantly, contemporary Americans no longer adhere to the 
idea of community and a harmony of social interests; they per-
ceive individuals in positions of authority as acting on behalf of 
their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of others. The 
civil rights and other liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
brought before the public the concept of individual autonomy and 
also developed a strategy that was founded on the premise that 
minority groups had to organize in order to press their particular-
istic demands. Finally, the changes in the economy that retarded 
rapid growth coincided with the disillusionment engendered by 
the Vietnam conflict; both completed the destruction of the Pro-
gressive consensus. 
Such developments helped to create a new libertarian model 
that accepted the need for state intervention, but simultaneously 
insisted that public authority be curbed and the objects of protec-
tion given a major role in the shaping of various ameliorative 
programs. Conceding that such a model could easily give a new 
legitimacy to social neglect, Rothman nevertheless emphasizes its 
benefits. "Can we do good to others, but on their own terms?" he 
asks in his concluding paragraph. "Rather than wondering how 
professional expertise and discretionary authority can be exer-
cised in the best interest of the client or the patient, we should 
ponder how the objects of authority can protect themselves 
against abuse without depriving themselves of the benefits that 
experts can deliver." 
The final essay in this collection is by Ira Glasser, who began 
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his career in social work for the blind and is currently executive 
director of the New York Civil Liberties Union. In a deliberately 
provocative manner, Glasser attempts to lay down a series of 
principles that will somehow reconcile power with liberty in the 
modern welfare state. His beginning point is the eighteenth-
century fear of power and constituted authority that lay at the 
center of the American Revolution and ultimately gave rise to the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Eighteenth-century Americans, he 
argues, wanted to create legal and political structures in order to 
protect liberty, structures that would institutionalize an adver-
sarial relationship between individuals and their government. 
Unfortunately, the growth of the political institutions of the 
state was accompanied by the proliferation of social institutions 
of caring, including public schools, mental hospitals, housing au-
thorities, centers for the retarded, foster care agencies, homes for 
the aged, and welfare agencies for the poor. Unknowingly, liberals 
who created these allegedly beneficent institutions assumed the 
role of parents and failed to resist the impulse toward paternal-
ism. Vast discretionary power accrued to a public bureaucracy, 
which silently trespassed upon the private lives and rights of 
millions of individuals. Indeed, the Bill of Rights was no longer 
applicable to actions by school officials, social workers, housing 
officials, or mental health professionals; these groups were free to 
impose their own morality upon helpless clients. Social depen-
dency, in other words, resulted in profound violations of individ-
ual liberty. To prove his case, Glasser provides a lengthy list of 
the ways in which the rights of school children, welfare recipients, 
and mentally ill persons, to cite only a few examples, were sys-
tematically ignored or violated. 
What is required, insists the author, is a new set of principles 
to govern the relationship between social institutions and client 
populations. First, the Bill of Rights must apply to such institu-
tions in order to limit their authority over the lives of dependents. 
Second, the enforcement of these rights requires an external 
force, usually in the form of adversarial organizations whose em-
ployees owe loyalty only to their clients. Finally, every program 
for the dependent must be evaluated not on the basis of the good 
that it might achieve, but rather on the basis of the harm it might 
inflict. The application of such principles would limit the discre-
tionary authority of the government, which-beginning with the 
New Deal and ending with Richard M. Nixon- demonstrated the 
dangers of an unlimited public authority. Nor should the concept 
of the rights of dependents be equated with governmental neglect. 
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Instead, institutionalized means should forbid that type of exces-
sive zeal that often accompanies governmental power. "The en-
croachments of power upon liberty," concludes Glasser, "has 
many disguises"; there is less of a difference between a midnight 
knock on the door in the form of an eighteenth-century British 
soldier and a comparable visit by a twentieth-century caseworker 
than is commonly assumed. 
Ill 
Provocative in tone and challenging in nature, Doing Good 
focusses on the kinds of concerns that presently occupy the atten-
tion of lawyers, academics, and public decision-makers and offi-
cials. The eloquence and passion of each of the contributors at-
tests to the significance of the issues. Moreover, the book catches 
to a remarkable degree the contemporary disillusionment with 
the institutional solutions of the past. With the exception of Gay-
lin, each author sees fundamental flaws in America's effort to 
cope with social problems, and each offers in one way or another 
a prescription for change. 
Yet despite their eloquence, the authors have not conclu-
sively demonstrated the validity of their analysis or their propos-
als for change. Indeed, Doing Good can be criticized on two basic 
counts. First, the historical data that is employed is open to chal-
lenge. Second, the recommendations for new policies are not 
without problems. Taken together, both present formidable bar-
riers to an uncritical acceptance of some of the views expressed 
in this work. 
Let us turn first to the quality of the historical data used in 
these essays. That historical knowledge conditions to some degree 
attitudes and behavior in the present is obvious. The issue, there-
fore, is not whether historical knowledge will be employed to 
influence decision-making and public policies, but what kind of 
history will be used. Recently Ernest R. May observed that most 
policy-makers and policy advocates employ history badly rather 
than well: 
When resorting t<r an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that 
comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause 
to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it 
might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, 
they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stop-
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ping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might 
prove to be mistaken.2 
May's observations, in modified form, are equally applicable to 
some of the generalizations deduced from historical data in Doing 
Good. 
The analyses of Rothman and Glasser, for. example, rest in 
part upon a series of historical statements. Both present a view 
of the American past that assumes fundamental flaws in the so-
cial order. Specifically, they maintain that welfare institutions, 
in spite of the good and benevolent intentions of their founders, 
were quickly transformed into the instruments of self-serving bu-
reaucracies that ignored and abused the rights of clients. More-
over, institutions not only failed to rehabilitate but often in-
fantilized their inmates and made their future adaptation to so-
ciety more problematic. 
These are, of course, blanket indictments that no q.oubt ap-
peal to many. The difficulty with such claims is that in many 
instances the available evidence does not substantiate such 
claims. As a matter of fact, detailed studies of institutions make 
such sweeping generalizations untenable. For example, in a re-
cent micro-analysis of public poor relief in a mid-nineteenth-
century county, Elizabeth Gaspar Brown provided some data 
that hardly supports the allegation that such institutions served 
only their managers and contributed little to their clients. She 
found that between 1857 and 1866 more than half of all welfare 
recipients were given outdoor relief. Of these, most went to the 
county poor farm. Two groups provided the bulk of admissions to 
the farm: those who were sick and disabled and hence unable to 
work; and those families without a male head, whether headed 
by the mother or composed of an orphan or group of siblings, and 
therefore without any means of support. Surprisingly, those per-
sons sent to the county poor farm remained for only short perie>ds 
of time; the poor farm "was not a dumping bin but a way sta-
tion"; and the rate of recidivism was less than five percent of the 
total admitted. Brown concluded: 
In the last analysis, and at the vantage point of 110 years later, it 
is just possible that, however unwittingly, the superintendents of 
the poor, within the framework established by the statutes ~nd 
under the authority of the County Board, had operated an effective 
program of poor relief. After all, are not the realistic goals of any 
poor relief program the support of those absolutely unable to sup-
2. E. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST xi (1973). 
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port themselves and the assistance of those who can be brought to 
care for themselves so that, in fact, they can and will? With or 
without compassion-and probably without-the superintendents 
of .the poor . . .. seem to have achieved these goals. 3 
Both Rothman and Glasser also have brief but harsh words 
about the seemingly universal violation of individual rights in 
mental hospitals. The former, for example, relates the story of one 
Catherine Lake, who went to the Department of Justice in Wash-
ington, D.C., to press a claim for a pension. As she left the build-
ing a female police officer spotted her as someone in need of 
assistance. When Lake was unable to supply her home ad-
dress (even though she had found the Justice Department build-
ing), she was confined to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for "wander-
ing" in mind and body and remained there for the rest of her 
days despite her persistent efforts to gain freedom. 
Certainly we can express our deep .anger when violations of 
human dignity and rights occur. But Rothman's description of 
this case is grossly oversimplified, if not actually misleading. As 
in most cases, the issue was by no means simple or clearcut, for 
Lake, a woman of sixty-one years of age, was suffering from 
brain damage associated with senility. Rothman's discussion 
omits this fact, and also does not mention that the case was the 
subject of considerable litigation and played an important role in 
the evolution of the least-restrictive-alternative principle. In-
deed, an analysis of the printed record pertaining to the case 
reveals the inherent dilemma between the goal of providing for 
an individual's welfare and simultaneously protecting that per-
son's rights. As the Lake case abundantly demonstrates, there are 
no simple answers. 4 
But even if we concede that Rothman's summary of the trag-
edy of Catherine Lake was accurate, is the case typical? Is Roth-
man using some absolute, and utterly unattainable, standard to 
judge institutions? Unfortunately, neither Rothman nor Glasser 
addresses himself to such questions; each is content to substitute 
sweeping claims for hard data. This is not in any way to imply 
that mental hospitals did not violate the rights of some persons. 
3. Brown, Poor Relief in a Wisconsin County, 1846-1866: Administration and 
Recipients, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 79, 107 (1976). 
4. Compare Rothman's description of the Lake case, supra note 1, at 73, 95, with 
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); A. BROOKS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEM 727-32 (1974); and Chambers, Alternatives ta Civil Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH, L. REv. 1108, 1121 
n.59, 1140-41 (1972). 
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It is only to say that the record is far more complex than either 
author implies. 
Fortunately, there is a good deal of data dealing with the 
characteristics of institutionalized populations. Such data do not 
sustain the view that mental hospitals incarcerated patients or 
even provided therapy, facts that ought to compel a reconceptual-
ization about the role of mental hospitals. For example, the num-
ber of aged persons confined in mental hospitals rose sharply 
between 1890 and 1940. Nearly eighteen percent of all first admis-
sions to New York State mental hospitals in 1920 were diagnosed 
as psychotic either because of senility or cerebral arteriosclerosis. 
By 1940 this group accounted for nearly thirty-one percent of all 
first admissions. Similarly, Goldhamer and Marshall, in their 
classic study of rates of institutionalization in Massachusetts and 
New York, detailed the rise in the rate of hospitalization among 
the aged mentally ill between 1885 and 1941. 5 
Why were aged persons committed to mental hospitals? 
There is little evidence that the community perceived of them as 
threats to security. Nor can it be said that the function of institu-
tionalization was to alter the behavior of such persons according 
to middle-class norms. In point of fact, mental hospitals assumed 
responsibility for caring for older persons partly because of the 
absence of alternatives and partly because of the disproportionate 
increase in the number of individuals aged sixty-five and over 
from three to nine million between 1900 and 1940 (a period during 
which population increased from 75.9 to 131.6 million). Older 
persons were institutionalized in mental hospitals for a variety of 
reasons. Some were sent there because of the inability or unwill-
ingness of relatives to assume responsibility. Others had no fami-
lies to provide basic care. Still other senile individuals exhibited 
the kind of behavior that created family problems. 6 
Psychiatrists and public officials were well aware of the prac-
tice of committing older persons to mental hospitals. Unhappy 
with this situation but not lacking in compassion, they went 
along with this practice because there seemed in many cases to 
be no alternative. Dr. Charles C. Wagner, superintendent of the 
5. N.Y. ST. DEPI'. OF MENTAL HYGIENE ANN. REP. 174-75 (1939-1940); H. GOLDHAMER 
& A. MARSHALL, PSYCHOSIS AND CIVILIZATION 54, 91 (1953). For additional data, see N. 
DAYTON, NEW FACTS ON MENTAL DISORDERS (1940); C. LANDIS & J. PAGE, MODERN SOCIETY 
AND MENTAL DISEASE (1938); B. MALZBERG, Socw.· AND BIOLOGICAL AsPECTS OF MENTAL 
DISEASE (1940). 
6. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UmTED STATES: Cow-
NIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 15 (1975). 
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Binghampton State Hospital in New York, defined the issue in 
simple yet moving terms. He observed in 1900: 
We are receiving every year a large number of old people, some of 
them very old, who are simply suffering from the mental decay 
incident to extreme old age. A little mental confusion, forgetful-
ness and garrulity are sometimes the only symptoms exhibited, 
but the patient is duly certified to us as insane and has no one at 
home capable or possessed of means to care for him. We are unable 
to refuse these patients without creating ill-feeling in the com-
munity where they reside, nor are we able to assert that they are 
not insane within the meaning of the statute, for many of them, 
judged by the ordinary standards of sanity, cannot be regarded as 
entirely sane. 7 
Senility was by no means the only source of admissions of 
persons whose behavioral peculiarities were related to underlying 
physiological processes. Before the widespread use of penicillin 
and other antibiotics limited the course of venereal disease, in-
sanity resulting from syphilis accounted for substantial numbers 
of admissions to mental hospitals. Between 1911 and 1920 about 
twenty percent of all male first admissions to mental hospitals in 
New York State were cases of general paresis (the comparable 
rate for women was about one third that of men); other states had 
similar rates.8 Nor were syphilitic patients committed to mental 
hospitals necessarily being punished for their moral transgres-
sions. In the tertiary stage of this disease, massive damage to the 
central nervous sytem resulted not only in bizarre behavior but 
in dramatic neurological symptoms, paralysis, and eventually 
death. For such cases institutional care was almost a sine qua 
non; few households were prepared to cope with such problems. 
Since general hospitals lacked facilities to care for patients in the 
tertiary stage (which could last up to one or more years), responsi-
bility devolved upon the mental hospital. 
Overall at least one-third (and probably more) of all first 
admissions to state mental hospitals represented cases where 
behavioral symptoms were probably of somatic origin. In 1922, for 
example, 52,472 persons were admitted for the first time into 
7. 12 N.Y. ST. CoMMN. ON LUNANCY ANN. REP. 29-30 (1900). See also 22 PA. COMM, 
ON LUNACY ANN. REP. 8-9 (1904). 
8. 52 N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE ANN. REP. 176 (1939-1940). For comparable 
data for other states, see 12 lLL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE ANN. REP. 310 (1928-1929); N.C. 
CHARITABLE, PENAL, AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS BIENNIAL REP. 48 (1930-1932); 15 Omo 
DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE ANN. REP. 304 (1936); 1 Omo Bo. OF ADM1N. ANN. REP, 43-44 
(1912); 4 OR. ST. Bo. OF CONTROL BIENNIAL REP. 47 (1919-1920); 7 WASH, ST. DEPT, OF 
BUSINESS CONTROL BIENNIAL REP. 27 (1933-1934). 
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state mental hospitals. Of this number, 15,916 were sent there 
because of senility, cerebral arteriosclerosis, general paresis, cere-
bral syphilis, Huntington's chorea, brain tumor or disease, or 
other somatic illnesses. The statistics a decade later showed 
much the same pattern.9 
To maintain that aged and senile groups as well as those 
suffering from physical impairments with accompanying behav-
ioral symptoms did not belong in mental hospitals, or to insist 
that individual rights were ignored, is in part to misunderstand 
the broader context of social change in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. In point of fact, a high rate of geographical mobil-
ity, a rapid increase in the size of urban areas, and the inability 
of traditional means of alleviating distress and dependency by 
reliance on familial and community traditions and practices, led 
Americans increasingly to turn to quasi-public or public institu-
tions that acted in surrogate capacities. Schools assumed respon-
sibility for the education and socialization of children; mental 
hospitals were given authority to care for the mentally ill; and 
institutions for diverse groups, including orphans, juveniles, re-
tarded, unemployables, and unemployed, to cite only a few, pro-
liferated rapidly. 
Mental hospitals, in other words, cared for a variety of per-
sons. Some individuals were institutionalized because of physical 
disability. In other cases_, hospitals served as asylums for persons 
who for one reason or another seemed to require a structured 
environment. Noting that it was often alleged that public mental 
hospitals cared for persons who could have just as easily been sent 
home, the Pennsylvania Commission on Lunacy concluded in 
1898 that no doubt many could be sent home "provided that the 
home existed, or that conditions at home were suitable for the 
patient's return"; unfortunately these conditions did not always 
exist. Frederick H. Wines, one of the most influential figures in 
late nineteenth-century public welfare, observed that many men-
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS 1926 AND 1927, 
at 9 (1930); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS 1931 AND 
1932, at 6 (1934). 
There are, of course, some significant regional variations. Pellagra (a disease caused 
by a dietary deficiency and often accompanied by behavioral symptoms) was generally 
confined to the South. Between 1900 and 1932 the State Hospital at Goldsboro, North 
Carolina (which was limited to black patients), reported that no less than 19% of its 
admissions were due to pellagra. In Northern hospitals, on the other hand, the disease 
was virtually unknown. See N.C. CHARITABLE, PENAL, AND CORRECTIONAL 'INSTITUTIONS 
BIENNIAL REP. 48 (1930-1932). 
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tal hospitals were imposed on iri "that patients are sent to them 
who should not be so sent, because their friends wish to avoid the 
responsibility of keeping and caring for them at home." 10 To dis-
cuss institutional populations only with reference to abstract 
rights and not to take into consideration concrete situations is to 
distort issues in very significant ways. 
Implicit in the essays by Rothman and Glasser is also the 
view that dependent populations had little authority and power 
to determine their fate; basic decisions were made by bureau-
cratic managers and others. Such a thesis runs directly counter 
to the work of many social historians, some of whom have gone 
to considerable lengths to demonstrate that lower-class and de-
pendent groups were not powerless. Indeed, the functions of some 
institutions reflected as much the characteristics of their inmate 
populations as the desires of their staffs. In a forthcoming study 
of the Temporary Home for the Destitute and the Massachusetts 
School for the Feeble-Minded, both of which were established in 
Boston in 1847, Peter L. Tyor and Jamil S. Zainaldin stress the 
developmental and variegated character of two kinds of institu-
tions. Initially each came into existence to meet a perceived need 
in society. In a second stage of their history each began to adjust 
and to specialize to meet unanticipated demands for care. During 
the third stage policy underwent further changes as client needs 
changed. In the case of the Home, new functions-including in-
fant adoption and internal agency services-altered its original 
character; in the case of the School custodialism emerged as a 
major theme. The fourth and final stage was marked by rationali-
zation and consolidation; service referrals; increased contacts 
with other institutions; and a growing professionalization. In-
deed, the discovery of seemingly high rates of retardation in the 
Bay State led the superintendent of the School for the Feeble-
Minded to emphasize noninstitutional rather than custodial solu-
tions. The findings of Tyor and Zainaldin, which may or may not 
be applicable to other types of institutions, are nevertheless re-
vealing; they demonstrate the importance not only of institu-
tional leadership and perceived social needs, but also the signifi-
cance of those who patronize institutions. Moreover, their data 
and analysis render it virtually impossible to view institutions in 
static terms or to neglect the influence of client populations upon 
their internal development. 11 
10. 16 PA. COMM. ON LUNACY ANN. REP. 44-45 (1898); 17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 431 (1890). 
11. See P. Tyor & J. Zainaldin, Redefining the American Asylum: A Case Study 
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To those who are unfamiliar with the rich literature of Amer-
ican history, Glasser's description of the origins and meaning of 
the American Revolution and Rothman's analysis of Progressiv-
ism will seem authoritative and convincing. Yet there are funda-
mental problems with the ways in which each uses historical 
data. Glasser's interpretation of the American Revolution, for 
example, rests largely, if not exclusively, upon a reading of Ber-
nard Bailyn's study of its ideological origins. 12 Bailyn stressed 
that an elaborate theory of politics lay at the heart of Revolution-
ary ideology-an ideology that could be traced back to the anti-
authoritarian tradition in England. Man, according to this tradi-
tion, had a natural lust for power, and power by its very nature 
was a corrupting force that could be attained only by depriving 
others of their liberty. During the 1760s and 1770s this ideology 
became a driving force among colonials, who saw in the actions 
of British ministers and officials a conspiracy to deprive them of 
their liberties. Beginning with Bailyn's brilliant analysis of the 
origins of the Revolutionary crisis, Glasser incorporates into his 
own chapter the idea that public officials and bureaucrats sub-
verted the goals of the American Revolution by gaining unwar-
ranted and corrupt power over client populations. 
The difficulty with such a thesis (as any good historian recog-
nizes) is that there are some major problems with Bailyn's view 
of the Revolutionary crisis. If a persuasive and powerful ideology 
lay at the heart of the Revolution, why did so many colonials 
choose to remain loyal to the Crown? John Adams once estimated 
that one third of the Americfµl people were revolutionaries, one 
third loyalists, and one third had remained neutral. If Adams's 
observation was valid (and most scholars concede that it was), 
can Bailyn's interpretation be accepted without any qualifica-
tions? Moreover, Glasser ignores the often harsh treatment of 
loyalists, whose individual rights were often violated in massive 
ways. There are real dangers in accepting uncritically a particular 
historical interpretation merely because it provides a convenient 
base from which to launch one's own thesis. 
Similarly, Rothman's description of the Progressive tradition 
is open to challenge because of its one-sided and sometimes ex-
treme nature. Progressives, according to Rothman, developed a 
Approach (forthcoming in J. Soc. HisT, [Sept. 1979]). Other institutional studies also 
demonstrate the important role of inmates in determining the functions and structures of 
such institutions. See, e.g., G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPI'IVES (195&). 
12. B. BAILYN, THE fuEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION (1967). 
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concept of the state based on the analogy of the relationship 
between parent and child. Consequently, Progressive programs 
were paternalistic and coercive, ignored the rights of clients, and 
above all were committed to the goal of obliterating the charac-
teristics of different social and ethnic groups. In short, Progres-
sives were moral absolutists who were persuaded that the legiti-
macy of their values gave them unlimited dominion over the lives 
of others. 
It cannot be denied, of course, that some Progressives were 
of the type described by Rothman. But were all Progressives 
alike? Again, a detailed knowledge of the reform tradition in 
twentieth-century America hardly supports such sweeping 
claims; Progressives were a far more diverse group than Rothman 
implies. Progressivism was a broad movement that included fig-
ures who disagreed over both means and ends. Some Progressive 
programs were undoubtedly coercive in nature; the eugenics 
movement, which resulted in the passage of numerous state laws 
providing for the involuntary sterilization of thousands of per-
sons, is perhaps an extreme example.13 But not all Progressives 
were hostile toward different social groups; some were able to 
empathize and to appreciate the value of cultural heterogeneity. 
Indeed, even within social work there was a split between the 
charity-organization movement of the 1880s and its successor in 
the early ·part of the twentieth century. Although both accepted 
the superiority of middle-class values, the latter was far more 
understanding and appreciative of alternative traditions and life-
styles. Moreover, some Progressives came out of immigrant back-
grounds and understood the vitality of their cultural, religious, 
and social traditions. 14 
What is most objectionable about Rothman's essay is his 
refusal to pay attention to the nuances and subtleties of Progres-
sivism. His generalizations may appeal to contemporary activ-
13. For an analysis of the eugenics movement and the history of sterilization in the 
United States, see M. HALLER, EUGENICS (1963); D. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE 
PROGRESSIVES (1968); Vecoli, Sterilization: A Progressive Measure?, 43 Wis. MAG. HIST, 
190-202 (1960). 
14. Data illustrating the heterogeneity of Progressive thought can be gleaned from the 
following sources: P. BoYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 
(1978); R. BREMNER, FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1956); C. A. CHAMBERS, PAUL u. KELLOGG AND THE SURVEY: VOICES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1971); C. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM: AMERICAN SOCIAL SERVICE 
AND SOCIAL ACTION, 1918-1933 (1963); A. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL 
SETrLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1890-1914 (1967); D. LEVINE, JANE ADDAMS 
AND THE LmERAL TRAomoN (1971). 
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ists, but they hardly represent the best in historical scholarship. 
It is also noteworthy that Rothman is deliberately selective in the 
specific programs he chooses to discuss. Absent from his chapter 
is any mention of the effort to secure passage of a compulsory 
-health insurance program between 1912 and 1920 or the back-
ground of the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Neither 
of these examples would necessarily support his broad concep-
tualization of Progressivism.15 In raising such criticisms, I do not 
deny that there is some truth in Rothman's presentation. His 
skewed analysis, however, hardly does justice to the issues even 
though it supports his prescriptions for the present and future. 
If the quality of the historical data leaves something to be 
desired, the strength of some of the logic and policy recommenda-
tions in Doing Good are also open to challenge. Overall, Gaylin's 
essay is easily the most persuasive, partly because of his willing-
ness to make distinctions. Indeed, the thrust of his remarks is 
,strikingly similar to the thinking of many of those who were part 
of America's Progressive tradition. Gaylin's basic theme is that 
caring for others, particularly those unable to care for themselves, 
is what defines our very humanity.16 Perhaps his only vulnerabil-
ity arises out of his insistence that the category of the extrinsi-
cally dependent be altered, and that the solution "merely" in-
volves an appropriate use of economic and political mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, the problem of finding solutions is not as simple 
as he assumes. Often resolution of one problem creates new ones; 
to believe that it is easy to transform the condition of individuals 
allegedly made dependent by their culture is to assume a degree 
of control over human affairs that I am not persuaded is justified. 
Steven Marcus's eloquent discussion of English welfare in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century also raises problems. 
Marcus relies on older classic works by Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
and J .L. and Barbara Hammond as well as more recent studies 
by E.J. Hobsbawm, David Roberts, W.E. Tate, and others.17 As 
15. See A. ALTMEYER, THE FoRMA'11VE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966); R. LUBOVE, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935 (1968); D. NEISON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1915-1935 (1969); R. NUMBERS, Al.MOST PERSUADED: 
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE, 1912-1920 (1978). 
16. See W. GAYLIN, CARING (1976). 
17. Marcus's essay used the following sources: J. CHAMBERS & G. MINGAY, THE AGRI-
CULTURAL REVOLUTION 1750-1880 (1966); J. CLAPHAM, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN 
BRITAIN (1926-1938); F. EDEN, THE STATE·OF THE POOR (1797); s. FINER, THE LIFE AND TrMEs 
OF SIR EDWIN CHADWICK (1952); J. HAMMOND & B. HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER, 1760-
1832: A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND BEFORE THE REFORM BILL (1911); E. 
HoBSBAWM & G. Ruoi;i, CAPTAIN SWING (1969); S. PASsFIELD & B. PASsFIELD, ENGLISH LocAL 
GOVERNMENT: A SERIES , • • ON THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH LocAL 
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a group, these works tend to emphasize the evolution of laws 
governing welfare and, to a lesser extent, concepts of poverty and 
its relief. They are, on the other hand, less revealing about the 
manner in which English welfare actually functioned. Conse-
quently, we are forced to suspend a measure of judgment until 
English historians illuminate in greater detail the practice (as 
compared with the theory) of welfare. 
Much more troubling is Marcus's conclusion. Granted that 
dependents, precisely because they are often unable to help 
themselves, deserve to be protected from "the unintended conse-
quences of our benevolence and . . . our social good will." What 
does such a statement mean in operational terms? If unintended 
consequences give rise to less than desirable results, how is it 
possible, at least from a logical viewpoint, to anticipate those 
consequences if they were unanticipated? Moreover, the lessons 
to be drawn from Marcus's presentation are at best ambiguous. 
Is he arguing that wage supplements destroyed both the incentive 
to pay high wages and the incentive to increase productivity? Or 
is he insisting that institutional relief in almshouses and work-
houses created a situation where people refused to avail them-
selves of relief until they were actually faced with starvation? It 
is possible to draw from Marcus's presentation a variety of pro-
grammatic and political conclusions, precisely because of his 
ambiguous mode of presentation. Until he can clarify his argu-
ment, the relevance of his remarks for social policy issues will 
remain obscure. 
Rothman's and Glasser's essays exemplify the contemporary 
reaction against many aspects of the modern welfare state. What 
both demand is a clearer delineation and limitation of state au-
thority and an end to open-ended grants of power to bureaucratic 
administrators in order to limit their discretionary authority over 
dependent groups. To achieve these goals they would expand 
sharply the role of lawyers, who would represent the interests of 
dependent populations and assume an adversarial role toward the 
state and public agencies. 
To expand individual rights and to limit state power are 
surely laudable goals. That the achievement of such goals is nec-
essarily compatible with an enhanced role for the legal profession 
GOVERNMENT (1963 reprint); K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); J. POYNTNER, 
SOCIETY AND PAUPERISM (1969); D. ROBERTS, VICTORIAN ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH WELFARE 
STATE (1960); W. TATE, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMMUNITY AND THE ENCLOSURE MOVEMENTS 
(1967). 
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(or for individuals acting in a surrogate capacity) is more ques-
tionable. Indeed, there are many reasons why it may be midesira-
ble to move in the direction of maximizing the importance of legal 
and formal rules. Insistence that society function according to 
strict rules and procedures may very well promote rather than 
diminish the dehumanizing bureaucratization that Glasser and 
Rothman condemn. I also have grave reservations about permit-
ting any occupational group, including the legal profession, to 
play an unduly influential role in the public policy and adminis-
tration process. That dependent clients deserve to have their 
rights protected and their welfare enhanced is true; that the way 
to achieve these goals is to increase the involvement of the legal 
profession is another question entirely. 
IV 
Not long ago J.H. Plumb, the eminent English scholar, drew 
a sharp distinction between the past and history. History, he 
insisted, is not the past, even though there are common elements 
to both. History represented an effort "to see things as they ac-
tually were, and from this study to formulate processes of social 
change which are acceptable on historical grounds and none 
other." The past, on the other hand, had always been a "created 
ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or moti-
vate societies, or inspire classes. " 18 
Plumb's comments are particularly relevant to the issues 
raised in Doing Good. In their efforts to promote social change, 
some of the authors have employed a one~sided view of the past 
that is open to challenge. Nevertheless, they have also performed 
a useful service by focussing attention on a subject largely ignored 
by historians. Given the fact that American society is acutely 
conscious of the social problems of aging, illness, and unemploy-
ment-to mention only a few examples-it is important that we 
should at least begin with a more accurate re-creation of the 
history of social problems and social policy .19 
18. J. PLUMB, THE DEATH OF THE PAST 13, 17 (1970). 
19. There are a variety of historical problems that require study in order to ensure 
that our view of the present is not colored by distorted perceptions of the past. We need 
to know more about the composition and demographic characteristics of dependent popu-
lations and how these characteristics changed over time. Equally important, we must be 
aware that social policy has not been static; it is just as important to understand the 
process as it is to understand the outcome. Too little attention has been given to the 
relationship between the origins and development of policy, the structure of the political 
system, and public perceptions of social problems. Too often scholars have uncritically 
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Our understanding of social policy issues, however, is not 
threatened solely by a distorted view of the past. On the contrary, 
it is threatened as well by current formulations based on dubious 
logic and knowledge. One of the underlying assumptions of Doing 
Good is that benevolence and good intentions can have disastrous 
consequences. What is left unresolved is the question of why goals 
and accomplishments are often at variance. To insist that an 
unequal distribution of power between elites and dependent pop-
ulations is the critical element is unsatisfactory. The problem in 
fact may be far more complex. Put in simple terms, I am not fully 
persuaded that the modern confidence in the ability of human 
beings to control their environment is completely warranted. The 
record of the past should make us somewhat suspicious about a 
faith that comes close to assuming a form of human omnipotence. 
Social and behavioral science to the contrary, knowledge about 
social behavior and institutions-to say nothing about individual 
behavior-remains limited and fragmentary. To pass laws em-
bodying desirable social goals is one thing; to guarantee that they 
will function in the intended manner is quite another. Indeed, 
there is much to be said in favor of a view that begins with an 
acceptance of human fallibility rather than human omnipotence. 
To recognize that human beings are capable of evil is not, after 
all, synonymous with the concept of negative government. 
It is equally important to recognize that there may be no 
solutions that are themselves not the source of further problems. 
The history of disease is a case in point. Public policy and atti-
tudes in America seem to be based in large measure upon the 
belief that it is possible to conquer disease; the result has been a 
phenomenal increase in the resources allocated to treatment and 
research. The actual record, on the other hand, hardly warrants 
such optimism. When infectious diseases (which killed large 
numbers of infants and children) began to decline in importance 
as a result of public health innovations and changes in the stan-
dard of living in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
accepted a rational model of politics (which holds that there are direct linkages between 
the preferences of the electorate, legislators, and policy outcomes), even though there is 
relatively little empirical data to substantiate the accuracy of such a model. Similarly, 
our knowledge of the manner in which laws were administered and how modes and styles 
of administration reflected or determined policy is' deficient. Finally, in undertaking fur-
ther research into the history of social policy, we must not simplify when to do so may 
distort the past beyond redemption. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the very concept 
of social policy is misleading, particularly when the varied nature of dependent popula-
tions, geography, and political and cultural traditions are taken into account. 
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ries, more people survived to adulthood. Consequently, there was 
an increase in degenerative disease (e.g., cardiovascular disease 
and cancer), the incidence of which is proportionately higher in 
nations with aged populations. The decline in one set of illnesses, 
therefore, was in part the occasion for a corresponding increase 
in a different group. Given the inevitability of death, the 
"conquest" of cancer and cardiovascular diseases would in all 
likelihood enhance the significance of other diseases. 20 · 
Moreover, social policy issues are rarely simple or clear-cut. 
The issue of involuntary commitment of the mentally ill is partic-
ularly enlightening in this respect. Influenced by the opponents 
of institutionalization, a number of state legislatures during the 
1960s and 1970s passed laws whose goals-at least in t:b.eory-
were to discharge as many involuntarily committed patients 
as possible from mental hospitals and thereby to restore to 
them their rightful liberties. An unstated objective of some advo-
cates of such legislation, perhaps, was the eventual abolition of 
all public mental hospitals. Contributing to the attack on institu-
tional care was the growing activism of both the federal and state 
judiciary. In Rouse v. Cameron, 21 David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, insisted that if the purpose of involuntary hospitalization was 
treatment (as distinguished from preventing some real danger to 
self or others), then the absence of treatment called into doubt 
the constitutionality of confinement. In the equally famous deci-
sion in Wyatt v. Stickney, 22 Federal District Judge Frank M. 
Johnson of Alabama established minimum constitutional stan-
dards for adequate treatment of the mentally ill. With the sup-
port of various groups and organizations, the amount of such 
litigation increased dramatically during the past decade. Many 
20. For brilliant discussions of this theme, see R. DUBos, MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS, 
PROGRESS, AND BIOLOGICAL CHANGE (1959); R. DUBOS, MAN ADAPTING (1965). 
The introduction of the widespread use of antibiotics during the 1940s provides an 
illustration of this theme. Prior to the introduction of penicillin, the infections that played 
a major role in morbidity were caused by pneumococci, streptococci, tubercle bacilli, and 
staphylococci. By about 1958, with the exception of staphylococci, these bacteria were 
rarely a factor in fatal diseases; they had been replaced by fungi and gram-negative rods. 
Moreover, certain species, hitherto relatively harmless, now assumed an infectious natur.e 
since other microorganisms that had competed with them had been suppressed by the 
introduction of antibiotic drugs. Finally, resistance to antibiotic drugs can be transferred 
under specific kinds of conditions. For a discussion of these points, see H. DOWLING, 
FIGHTING INFECTION: CONQUESTS OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 191-92 (1977). 
21. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
22. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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of the court cases involved such issues as the right to least restric-
tive treatment, compensation for labor within hospitals, freedom 
from cruel and inhuman punishment, and due process. 2a 
The results of such agitation, however, were at the very least 
ambiguous. In a large number of cases individuals were dis-
charged from mental hospitals, only to be thrust into a setting 
that was not necessarily,conducive to their welfare. The theoreti-
cal emphasis on the right to least restrictive treatment, moreover, 
was hardly relevant to cases involving individuals unable to care 
for themselves and for whom there was no known treatment. In-
deed, critics of institutionalization, precisely because they dis-
cussed the issue of involuntary commitment largely in terms of 
abstract individual rights, avoided the far more difficult task of 
evaluating theory in the light of concrete situations that rarely 
offered clear-cut moral choices. In many instances the applica-
tion of a single general principle often has the inadvertent conse-
quence of invalidating another general principle that may be 
equally compelling. An absolutist definition of freedom, for ex-
ample, may very well negate other humanitarian or ethical prin-
ciples and rights. It is entirely possible to honor the absolute 
rights to liberty of persons in an advanced state of senility by not 
hospitalizing or institutionalizing them, while denying their right 
to care from society when they are helpless by not hospitalizing 
them and allowing them to die from exposure, starvation, and 
lack of care. 
Although Doing Good raises interesting questions, its flawed, 
one-sided, and simplistic historical foundations makes it difficult 
to accept either its analyses or policy recommendations (at least 
in the form in which they are put). It is unfortunate that its 
authors chose to act as committed activists and thus avoided 
dealing with the complexity and ambiguity of social policy issues. 
Indeed, if the ultimate standard against which social policy 
should be judged is the benefit and welfare of the dependent, 
increasing individual freedom may be just as debilitating as insti-
tutionalization. In other words, the authors of this volume (Gay-
lin excepted) may be as guilty as those they attack. They assume 
their solutions will achieve the results that earlier policies and 
institutions could never achieve, in terms of alleviating distress 
and caring for dependent persons. They could be quite wrong. 
23. For a general discussion of psychiatry and policy, see R. SLOVENKo, PsYCHIATJW 
AND LAW (1973). 
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After all, no matter how good their intentions, they can still pave 
that proverbial road to hell! 
